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The Privatisation of Asylum
Accommodation in the UK: Winners
and Losers 





1 Britain has a long tradition of hosting and welcoming migrants and refugees, being one
of  the  first  13  signatories  of  the  1951  Geneva Convention on refugees.  Housing,  as
underlined by many studies,1 is key to their integration into British society. However,
while the national housing crisis and the changes in house prices attract much media
attention, the housing problems refugees face do not get much press coverage, apart
from by the specialist media (Inside Housing for instance). When they do, it is mostly
from the tabloid press which is quick to denounce the ‘over indulgent’ access to social
housing migrants and refugees are said to enjoy.2 
2 The housing conditions of asylum seekers are even more problematic. They are not
only  constrained  by  the  national  housing  shortage  but  have  also  been  redefined
following a major structural overhaul of asylum accommodation in the past 10 years
which amounts to a privatisation of the system, although its operation and regulation
mark it apart from the traditional privatisation of utilities. 
3 This article will review and analyse the transformations of the system designed by the
UK authorities to accommodate asylum seekers, in order to assess the extent to which
it  has  been  privatised  and  the  consequences  of  these  transformations.  First,  I  will
review the concept of privatisation in order to try and understand the specificities of
the privatisation policies applied to asylum accommodation. Then, I will locate housing
within the controversial issue of asylum and migration to the UK, before exploring the
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legislative  changes  introduced  by  successive  governments  to  the  asylum
accommodation programme and their motivations. I will next assess the consequences
of  and  the  problems  thrown  up  by  this  privatisation,  before  concluding  on  how
privatisation has played out in a policy area largely regulated by international law. 
4 This  paper  only  focuses  on  asylum  seekers,  namely  someone  who  has  arrived
independently in the UK, has applied for asylum and is awaiting a decision on whether
they will be granted refugee status or not.3 I shall not look into the housing of other
categories of migrants such as resettled people4 or even refugees. Besides, I shall not
look at the devolved nations in detail but at the UK in general as immigration is not a
devolved matter. 
 
The Privatisation of Public Services in the UK
5 Along with the USA, the UK has been a driving force behind the privatisation of the
world’s economy for the past 40 years. In the UK, this privatisation momentum was
unleashed by the Conservative government formed after Margaret Thatcher’s electoral
victory in 1979 and the coming to power of the so-called New Right.5 The determination
of successive Conservative governments to privatise the economy can be accounted for
by the neoliberal component of the New Right. Indeed, its philosophy is by and large
averse to state intervention in the economy6 and has been summarised by Nicholas
Bosanquet  by  a  thesis  and  an  antithesis:  Bosanquet  argues  that  for  the  New Right
“society has a  natural  tendency to  order  and the economy a natural  tendency to  growth”.7
Conversely, he argues, for the New Right the negative result of state intervention is
that as “politicisation” grows, politics becomes concerned with vote-buying and public
spending and taxation get out of control.8 
6 It follows from this outlook that government intervention is seen as likely to create
chaos and disrupt these natural tendencies and that the role of government should be
kept to a minimum, namely upholding law and order, justice,  national security and
setting the right framework for the market to thrive. The New Right’s determination to
privatise derives from the belief  that the market is  the best  mechanism to allocate
resources as it is thought to match supply and demand and achieve a balance if left to
its own devices. Privatisation also derives from the need to secure accumulation and
profit by means of competition between individuals and companies in order to fuel the
market economy. “Because this  acquisitive  momentum produces  material  abundance,  it  is
claimed that self- interest benefits society as a whole”.9 
7 Because of these ideological premises, in the UK, the state has been the subject of “a
permanent revolution”10 for four decades and privatisation has been one aspect of this
revolution. This has taken many forms. Since 1980, reforms have been introduced in
the  UK to  change  and  privatise  what  Le  Grand  and  Robinson called  one  year  into
Thatcher’s  second  term  “the  three  modes”  of state  activity:  provision,  subsidy  and
regulation.11 Successive  governments,  not  only  Conservative  but  also  New Labour, 12
have upheld a ‘small state’ consensus and sought to curtail these three modes, reducing
state provision, subsidies, and regulation. 
8 The welfare state and public services have been a prime target for the New Right in the
UK.  Indeed,  the  foundations  on  which  post-war  public  services  were  built  were
criticised by New Right proponents and said to be in need of reforms for a number of
reasons: they were said to be too costly, to favour the middle classes more than the
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poor,13 to  be  controlled  by  vested  interests  and  finally  to  limit  choice. 14 Their
privatisation has not always been visible as it does not always involve the replacement
of the state by the market (‘denationalisation’) or contracting out, but can be limited to
“the  shift  from one  form of  intervention  to  another  one  or  the  encouragement  of  the  third
sector”.15 The  contours  of  public  services  have  become blurred as  these  shifts  have
sometimes morphed into “the privatisation of the production of a service that is still state
financed”.16 This is especially true in the field of housing where from 1988 until recently
the state-subsidised the voluntary sector to build social housing. More specifically, the
privatisation  of  housing  in  the  UK  has  involved  denationalisation  (right  to  buy),
liberalisation (increasing the role of the private and third sectors) and contracting out
(of its management to new structures such as TMOs and ALMOs17 or the private sector).
Besides,  the  direction  of  change,  the  nature  and  extent  of  privatisation  can  be
constrained by the “previous pattern of state provision and intervention”, as some scholars
argue.18
9 Where the state has not been privatised, its operation has been profoundly reformed
through a “managerialisation” process designed to remodel it on the lines of the private
sector.19 This is said to have occurred in two stages: first, in the 1980s, the onus was on
cost  control,  performance  indicators  and  targets;  then,  from  the  late  1980s  on,
decentralisation  and  quasi-markets  were  introduced.20 In  order  to  reform  public
services, successive governments since 1980 have drawn on a number of mechanisms
including  fragmentation,  competition,  private  management  practices,  economies
(savings), the creation of a managers’ tier, performance assessment and payment by
result.21
10 The result of this revolution has been, as LeGrand and Robinson predicted as early as
1984,  that:  “the  state  will  be  involved  through  subsidisation  and  through  helping
entrepreneurship by others, rather than through direct public provision”.22
11 Housing in the UK has been significantly impacted by these reforms and has been in the
vanguard of this privatisation programme for a number of reasons: first,  because it
breached a number of New Right principles (control of the money supply, reduction of
the  Public  Sector  Borrowing  Requirement23 and  freedom  of  choice). 24 Second,  the
number of winners was large and visible (those former tenants who have become home
owners  under  the  Right  to  Buy25)  while  losers  were  also  numerous  but  invisible
(taxpayers  footing  the  bill).26 Lastly,  housing  was  privatised  because  it  is  mostly  a
private good and local authorities were thought to be inefficient and dominated by
vested interests.27 One outcome of this privatisation process in the housing sector in
general has been its residualisation, namely the decline of the size of the council sector
and the concentration of poorer households in it.28 The commodification of the housing
sector through the sale of the more attractive council homes has indeed reinforced
social stratification: by 2016/17, only 43% of social rented households were in full or
part-time work, 21% were inactive and three quarters were in the bottom 40% of the
income distribution in England.29 It  has  also reinforced the concentration of  ethnic
minorities with all ethnic groups bar Indians, Mixed, other Whites and Chinese being
more likely to live in social housing than white British.30 The other outcome has been
that the Right to Buy has generated more than £58 billion in capital receipts for the
government, more than any privatisation programme since 1980 in the UK.31 
12 As we shall see in the next section, the privatisation of asylum accommodation derives
in part from a desire not to compound the socio-economic characteristics of the social
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sector; as in the case of the privatisation of council housing, it stems from a desire on
the part of central government to make savings. We shall to turn to the question of the
privatisation of asylum accommodation proper and examine it against the background
of asylum migration first.
 
Asylum Seekers in the UK: a Controversial Issue
13 Paradoxically, although the number of asylum seekers in the UK is much lower than in
the early 2000s, the salience of the question in public opinion has increased and it has
been  increasingly  subject  to  political  debate  and  instrumentalisation.  As  a  result,
governments  have introduced a  number of  legislative  changes  in  order  to  create  a
“hostile environment”32 which bears on the housing circumstances of asylum seekers. 
14 In  2018,  5.7%  of  all  international  immigrants  (namely  “people  who  change  their
country  of  residence for  at  least  one year”)  were  classified as  asylum seekers.  The
number of asylum applications to the UK rose from 1989 onwards, peaked in 2002 at
84,132 and then fell sharply to reach a twenty-year low point of 17,916 in 2010, before
rising again to reach 35,566 in 2019.33 These figures do not include resettled people as
explained above.34 Asylum seekers migrate from all parts of the globe and there is no
predominant geographical area of origin, although only 6% come from the Americas or
Oceania: in 2019, 29% of asylum applicants were nationals of Asian countries, 27% were
nationals of Middle Eastern countries, 24% were nationals of African countries, and 14%
were from Europe.35 Compared to other European countries of reception, the UK has a
low ratio of asylum seekers: in 2019, there were around 5 asylum applications for every
10,000  people  residing  in  the  UK,  while  across  the  EU28,  there  were  14  asylum
applications for every 10,000 people. The UK was therefore below the average among
EU countries for asylum applications per head and ranked 17th among EU28 countries
on this measure.36
15 Two key figures matter regarding housing provision. First, the percentage of asylum
applicants whose application was refused, since in theory their legal right to housing
comes to an end on refusal (see next section): the rate of refusal reached its highest
point at 88% in 2004. After that, the percentage of applicants refused asylum fell to 59%
in 2014, then rose again, before dropping to 48% in 2019.37 The second indicator is the
percentage of appeals that are successfully lodged, since persons appealing who are
successful have their right to housing reinstated: this stood at its lowest point in 2004
at 18%, increased to 42.2% in 2015, before falling back to 35.4% in 2018.38 
16 Although asylum seekers account for a lower proportion of international migrants in
the  UK  than  in  many  European  countries,  they  have  become  caught  up  in  the
immigration debate and their social and housing rights have been affected as a result.
Following Theresa May’s 2012 statement about creating “a hostile environment”, the
political determination to create such an environment for migrants is often associated
with the coalition government that was in power between 2010 and 2015. However, this
policy  agenda  originated  earlier,  in  the  mid-1990s.  Even  before  the  Coalition  was
formed, legislative changes, ministers’ statements,39 and increased European migration
following the 2004 expansion of the EU, had led to a change in public opinion and the
greater  salience  of  the  issue  of  migration.  This  contributed  to  the  perception  that
migrants benefited unfairly from social housing and other services, despite studies by
the  Equality  and Human Rights  Commission and the  Local  Government  Association
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showing that the view that “migrants are jumping social housing queues” is unfounded.
40
17 This agenda means that UK immigration policy has been “at the forefront of a growing
European ‘restrictionism’ towards refugees and asylum seekers” which has been driven
both by ideological and economic considerations.41 In the UK, “restrictionism” started
rising to the top of the political agenda during the Major years and stayed there during
the  New  Labour  years  when  the  party’s  immigration  policy  was  driven  by  two
principles:  limitation  of  public  expenditure  and  keeping  an  image  of  political
toughness.42 It has led to new entry requirements and restrictions to welfare for asylum
seekers once in the UK.
18 This new approach to immigration and more particularly asylum manifested itself most
prominently  in  1998  when  the  New  Labour  government  published  a  White  Paper
entitled  Fairer,  Faster  and  Firmer,  A  Modern  Approach  to  Immigration  and  Asylum.43 It
heralded a reform of the existing system with a view to creating “a new covenant”
based on “fulfilling the mutual obligations […] that exist between the Government and
those seeking asylum”.44 The document illustrated a hardening of discourse and policy
towards  asylum  seekers  and  continuities  with  previous  Conservative  governments.
While underlining the contribution international migration made to the UK, it pledged
“to deal quickly and firmly with those who have no right to enter or remain [in the
UK]” and to tease out “genuine applicants” from “abusive claimants”, so as to “to plan
and  allocate  resources  more  flexibly  in  order  to  minimise  costs  overall  […]  to  the
taxpayer”.45
19 As a result of this political consensus on an ‘exclusive citizenship’46, asylum seekers no
longer have similar rights in the field of housing to those granted to refugees and other
persons in need. From the mid-1990s onwards, a series of measures have curtailed their
housing rights as well as their choice. First, the 1993 Asylum and Immigration Appeals Act
abolished local  authorities’  duty to house asylum seekers  permanently.  Second,  the
1996  Asylum  and  Immigration  Act together  with  the  1996  Housing  Act defined  two
categories of asylum seekers (port-of-entry and in-country) and removed single asylum
seekers from the priority need categories of  the population whom local  authorities
have  had  a  duty  to  house  since  1977  if  at  risk  of  homelessness.47 More  generally,
successive legislative changes have reduced their welfare rights: in 2002, section 55 of
the Nationality,  Immigration and Asylum Act removed support from those who did not
make a claim “as soon as reasonably practicable” and “recourse to public funds” was no
longer possible for asylum relatives.48 In 2011, support was further reduced, with the
abolition of the Refugee Integration and Employment Service, the service designed to
help asylum seekers move out of the asylum system into real life, once they had been
granted refugee status.49 
20 However, the politicisation of the asylum issue and more generally of immigration in
the UK over  the last  30  years  has  not  only  impacted the housing rights  of  asylum
seekers and led to the rise of what some term “crimmigration”50: coupled with austerity
measures, it has also brought about the privatisation of asylum accommodation after
2010.
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The Privatisation of Asylum Accommodation
21 The housing rights of asylum seekers in 2020 are tightly defined and housing is part of
the help asylum seekers are entitled to under three circumstances: while the Home
Office is reviewing their application (section 95 of the Asylum and Immigration Act
1999) if they have no means of their own; while assessing whether they are eligible for
support (section 98); and when an applicant has been refused asylum but has not yet
left  the  country  (section  4).  Asylum  seekers  cannot  choose  where  they  will  be
accommodated and the current Home Office policy revolves around dispersing them
around  the  country.  On  arrival  in  the  UK  they  should  be  housed  in  Initial
Accommodation (IA) centres (there were seven in 2017) for up to 19 days while the
Home Office assesses whether they are eligible for accommodation and if so dispersed
to settled accommodation. However, if  no place is available in IA, applicants can be
temporarily housed in emergency accommodation (hotels, hostels, or B and Bs). If an
asylum application is accepted, “applicants have 28 days to secure housing and a means
to support themselves before their entitlements under section 95 are stopped”.51 They
become refugees and must leave the accommodation provided, and the local authority
then has a duty to rehouse them. However, if their application is rejected and they are
one  of  the  statutory  priority  categories,  the  local  authority  must  frequently  also
rehouse asylum seekers temporarily while they await deportation or appeal so that
they do not become homeless. 
22 At the end of December 2018, statistics showed that there were 43,549 asylum seekers
benefiting  from  section  95  assistance,  of  whom  40,072  were  living  in  dispersal
accommodation, namely not in IA anymore. The North East of England had the highest
proportion of dispersed asylum seekers relative to its population (6 for 10,000) and the
South  East  the  lowest.  Glasgow  and  Liverpool  had  the  highest  numbers  as  far  as
councils were concerned. That 62% of local authorities had no asylum seekers in 2018
highlights their concentration in some areas of the country.52
23 The privatisation of asylum accommodation is the outcome of a series of measures that
have  gradually  shifted  the  system  away  from  local  authorities  towards  private
contractors and sub-contractors. The formation of the Coalition in 2010 was a turning
point, although key changes introduced during the New Labour years paved the way for
this development. 
24 Before 1999, it fell upon the local authority where asylum seekers made a claim for
asylum to provide accommodation. The problem was that most were made in London
and the South East. In order to relieve the pressure on these areas, the newly elected
New  Labour  government  announced  changes  to  support  arrangements  in  the  1998
White  Paper  previously  mentioned  (Fairer,  Faster  and  Firmer:  A  Modern  Approach  to
Immigration and Asylum) in order to move towards a more integrated approach,53 and to
a centralised system. Asylum seekers arriving in the UK would henceforth fall under
the jurisdiction of a new body, the National Asylum Support Service (NASS), run by the
Home Office through regional  consortia whose remit  was to secure accommodation
from  various  providers  through  contracts.54 These  could  be  voluntary  bodies,  local
associations  or  companies  from  the  private  sector,  although  in  the  initial  funding
round local authorities dominated before being replaced by private sector entities after
2006 when council housing for asylum seekers became controversial.55 Accommodation
was to be provided on a “no choice” basis and was construed as a “safety net”.56 The
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two  key  motivations  behind  the  reform  were  greater  efficiency  through
“rationalisation” and cost-cutting: the existing system was said to cost £400 million and
likely  to  rise  to  double  that  amount  by  2000/01.57 The  reform  was  implemented
following the passing of the 1999 Asylum and Immigration Act. Further privatisation took
place  before  2010:  in  2002  under  the  Nationality,  Immigration  and  Asylum  Act,  a
programme of reception centres for asylum seekers was initiated (IA) and contracted
out to the private sector.58 The new arrangements resulted in a system of 22 separate
contracts with 13 different suppliers (a mixture of local authorities, private providers
and voluntary organisations) by 2012.59
25 The  formation  of  the  Coalition  in  2010  ushered  in  a  further  and  deeper  round  of
privatisation. The privatisation of asylum accommodation was retained (IA centres and
the increasing use of private landlords) and in addition to that the contracting process
was privatised. Since 2012, the accommodation of asylum seekers has been provided
through  contracts  managed  by  six  regional Commercial  and  Operational Managers
Procuring  Asylum  Support  Services  (COMPASS).  By  2018,  three  private  companies
(Serco, G4S, and Clearsprings) each held two of these contracts and operated “a supply
network  of  contractors,  sub-contractors  and  private  landlords”.60 Under  the  new
contract system, the Government aimed to make £140 million worth of savings in the
first  round.61 These  companies  were  known  to  the  Government  as  they  already
provided  services  to  the  Government,  but  only  Clearsprings  had  some  housing
experience. Contracts were given for five years, but in 2016 the government announced
that they would be extended until 2019 and that a new round of contracts would start
as of 2019.62 An invitation to tender was put out in November 2017 for 10-year contracts
worth £4 billon, in the seven regions covered by the UK Visas and Immigration Office
(the  three  devolved governments  plus  four  groupings  of  English regions).  The new
contracts,  known as Asylum Accommodation and Support Service Contracts (AASC),
were awarded in January 2019 to Serco, Mears Group and Clearsprings Ready Home. 
26 Serco won the new AASC contracts for the Midlands, the East of England, and the North
West, worth £1.9 billion over ten years. The company was originally founded in 1929 as
the British division of the Radio Corporation of America (RCA), and became a provider
of public services following a management buy-out in 1987 and stock exchange listing
in  1988.  Today  Serco  employs  more  than  50,000  people  worldwide.  It  describes  its
mission as “the delivery of essential public services […]in defence, transport, justice,
immigration, healthcare and other citizen services”.63 In 2019, it had an overall revenue
of  £  3,248  million  and  profits  of  £102.5  million,  across  four  continents.  It  aims  to
“improve the performance of public services […]” and prides itself on that fact that “a
strong  public  sector  ethos  runs  through  [their]  organisation”.64 Mears  Group  was
awarded contracts for the North East, Yorkshire, Humberside, Northern Ireland, and
Scotland. Similar to Serco, Mears was founded in 1988. It is smaller, with over 15,000
employees in 2016, and a turnover of £905.1 million in 2019. Mears only specialises in
housing-related services (maintenance, management, development, care and support
and planning) and manages 11,000 homes every day. Clearsprings/Ready Homes was
awarded contracts for Wales and the South of England. It was established in 2000, is a
subsidiary  of  Clearsprings  and  has  been  providing  homes  to  central  and  local
government for 14 years. It states that it has a portfolio of 15,000 homes and prides
itself on “providing value for money, quality and transparency”.65 
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27 Under the COMPASS terms as well as the AASC ones, contractors need to take a number
of factors into consideration when suggesting accommodation to the Home Office, such
as the concentration and availability of accommodation, the capacity of local public
services, or the level of risk of social tension if the number of asylum seekers increases.
66 Their  performance is  measured against  a  number  of  Key  Performance Indicators
(KPIs)  (9  for  COMPASS  including  three  for  accommodation  standards)  designed  to
improve the quality of services. When problems are brought to the attention of the
providers,  they  must  address  and  solve  them  within  a  specific  timescale  or  face
financial  penalties.67 Yet despite this legal framework, a number of issues/problems
have arisen. 
 
The Consequences of Privatisation
28 Since  2012,  successive  parliamentary  reports  have  highlighted  recurring  problems
posed by the contracting out of asylum accommodation.
29 First,  these  reports  underscore  the  poor  communication  between  the  various
stakeholders. In its 2018 report, the House of Commons underlined what it called the
“systemic mistrust” between some actors in the sector (the Home Office, NGOs, and the
Independent Chief Inspector of Borders and Immigration, ICBI). This was said to be due
to  the  NGOs and ICIB’s  concern that  the  Home Office  would  turn down an asylum
application and the contractor retaliate if complaints by asylum seekers about their
homes were made public.68 
30 Second,  there  is  a  lack  of  accountability  in  the  procurement  process  as  private
contractors are not answerable to local authorities although they operate within their
boundaries.  As  Andy  Burnham  (Mayor  of  Greater  Manchester)  and  other  council
leaders have complained, the new arrangements have created an unequal partnership
between the Home Office, the local authorities and the contractors: this was due to the
Home Office’s refusal to share “risk management information and contingency plans”69
(in  contracts),  but  above  all  to  the  lack  of  local  authority  oversight:  although  the
asylum dispersal scheme can only operate with their agreement, on a voluntary basis,
local authorities have no inspection or sanction power nor can they impose the same
housing standards regulations within their boundaries.70 Besides, although the housing
provider  must  consult  with  the  local  authority  regarding  the  accommodation
envisaged, the latter only has 72 hours to consider the request and if turned down on
the grounds of health and safety issues, the provider can “seek permission from the
Home Office to override the local authority’s objections”.71 The lack of power on the
part  of  local  authorities  is  all  the  more  paradoxical  as  they  have  to  pay for  extra
services provided to asylum seekers (health, education) although they receive no extra
funding from the central government unlike for Resettlement Programmes.72
31 The  discontent  expressed  by  local  authorities  is  also  caused  by  a  second  problem
created by the privatisation of asylum accommodation: the frequent use of substandard
dwellings  by  contractors.  The  standards  of  settled  accommodation  provided  by
contractors  are  regulated  by  the  Key  Performance  Indicators  applying  to
accommodation (KPI 4/5/6/7, see above) and should conform to them: this means that
contractors should provide accommodation that is safe, without any severe defects and
be well-maintained. Furthermore, they should make it possible for asylum seekers to
raise complaints and contractors should contractually address these within five days or
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respond to any emergency within the specified response time.73 Properties should be
inspected by providers (who are one and the same) at least once a month and every
time an asylum seeker moves out of a property. Besides, the Home Office is supposed to
inspect one third of all properties in a contract area every year. 
32 However, parliamentary reports have repeatedly underlined a number of failings: these
include the presence of vermin, of asbestos, cleanliness issues, inadequate facilities or
furnishings, and failing heating systems. The accommodation provided is inspected by
the contractor (with potential conflicts of interest even if subject to key performance
indicators),  but  the  local  authority  has  no  power  to  conduct  inspections.  These
problems were confirmed by an Independent report in 2018 highlighting that only 24%
of the properties inspected complied with the Compass requirements according to the
Home Office’s own inspectors, while 43% were not fit for purpose.74 As the ICIBI report
underlined, the Home Office, with a team of nine Contract Compliance Officers for the
whole country, was not able to meet its inspection targets.75 
33 Initial accommodation run by the private sector since 2020 poses even more problems.
Parliamentary reports have underlined that bathrooms and showers facilities in such
centres are sometimes dirty, pregnant women not always fed adequately and health
checks are not carried out properly so diseases are not always picked up.76 There is
sometimes not enough food, children are not always schooled and providers do not
always fulfil their obligations to provide transport to medical appointments.77 When
hotels are used in emergency situation, they can be substandard or unfit as the same
criteria are not applied as for settled accommodation.
34 When standards are not up to the key performance indicators, the Home Office can
impose fines or a service credit. Reports show that the records of the three contractors
from 2012 to 2019 varied widely: while Clearsprings was never sanctioned for missing
targets between 2012 and 2017, and G4S was not fined in 2015 and 2016, Serco was fined
almost every year.78 Worryingly, the subcontractors carrying out inspections on behalf
of the contractors did not appear to have the same definition of “urgent defects” and
“emergency  defects”  as  the  Home  Office,  which  itself  did  not  agree  with  local
authorities.79 
35 One issue that  privatisation was meant  to  solve  but  that  still  endures  for  different
reasons is the concentration of asylum seekers. The system introduced in 1999 that was
privatised in 2012 was meant to disperse asylum seekers away from London and the
South East. While this geographical shift has been achieved, it has been at the expense
of  the  Northern councils  that  have  taken part  in  the  programme.  Indeed,  the  cost
saving objectives of  the initial  programme have been compounded by the austerity
measures introduced by the Coalition after 2010. This has resulted in asylum seekers
being sent away from the existing communities80 and cheaper accommodation being
sought by contractors in order to keep within the financial constraints of the Home
Office contracts or to minimize their losses. Two problems have surfaced: on the one
hand, in these cheaper and often poorer areas where asylum seekers are concentrated,
deprived communities can be unwelcoming and suspicious of newcomers and an influx
of asylum seekers can push up local private rents or reduce accommodation supply,
thus leading to local tensions.81 On the other hand, some voluntary local authorities are
not able to provide accommodation as a consequence of local high housing prices.82 The
concentration of asylum seekers may not be visible at first sight as although the cluster
limit may not be reached (1 for 200 residents) at local authority level, there may be a
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high concentration at  ward level  where  the  limit  does  not  apply  because  of  cheap
housing being located in a few deprived wards. The problem is made worse by the fact
that while the number of asylum seekers almost doubled between 2012 and 2019, the
number of local authorities taking part in the scheme went down from 150 to only 121
(out of 453).83
36 The eviction of some asylum seekers from dispersal accommodation has drawn media
attention too: in a number of cases, where there are no health considerations and an
application has been rejected by the Home Office and the applicant refuses to leave,
locks on the property were changed by Serco while the applicant was out.84 This can
also  happen when the  applicant  has  received  a  positive  reply  but  has  not  secured
another  accommodation  within  the  28  legal  days  and  so  has  not  left.  However,  it
appears  that  Serco  also  ended  up  paying  the  rents  of  applicants  when there  were
(child) welfare considerations and the Home Office stopped funding.85 
37 Most of the problems described above derive from the new and faulty governance of
the  asylum  system.  However,  some,  such  as  service  fragmentation,  were  already
underlined in 2002.86 As the 2017 House of Commons report then noted, the main cause
of  the  current  problems  is  that  “although  the  system  of  three  providers  looks
straightforward on the surface, below it lies a complex network of contractors, sub-
contractors and private providers”.87 Indeed, the contractors themselves are required
to  source  accommodation  provision  from  various  providers.88 For  instance,  from
September 2012 to 2016, Serco subcontracted asylum housing to Orchard and Shipman,
a  specialist  lettings  agency,  in  Scotland  and  Northern  Ireland.  However,  following
complaints  about  O&S’s  treatment  of  asylum residents  and housing  conditions  and
Serco appearing before the Home Affairs committee, O&S’s operations were transferred
to  Serco.89 During  the  proceedings,  the  committee’s  chair  underlined  that  Serco
subcontracted its operations to 20 providers, who themselves, unbeknownst to Serco,
sometimes subcontracted their operations too. As the CEO of Serco explained, part of
the problem was that Serco only managed the estate but subcontractors were in charge
of the maintenance of their properties.90 
 
Conclusion
38 Asylum accommodation is illustrative of the privatisation revolution that has swept the
UK  since  the  1980s  in  many  ways.  As  in  other  policy  areas  (education  to  a  lesser
degree), local authorities have been deprived of most of their power and are no longer
service providers but only facilitators. They have all the risks but no tools to manage
these.91 Privatisation  has  been  motivated  by  a  desire  on  the  part  of  successive
governments to cut costs, streamline the existing system and paradoxically recentralise
it (i.e. the Home Office negotiates accommodation contracts directly with a handful of
contractors and defines targets and indicators), as well as a determination to diffuse
this political issue in this particular case. However, unlike for utilities, privatisation has
worked its way through contracting, subcontracting; the system remains a hybrid one
since  state  subsidies  are  used  to  provide  private  goods  (private  accommodation);
looking at the reform through LeGrand’s grid of analysis, it is clear that provision has
been privatised, but subsidy and regulation have not. The general result is a loss of
accountability, as private contractors are not accountable to local authorities and, as a
consequence, to local residents and voters. On the face of it, the governance of asylum
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accommodation has become simpler, more top-down, but underneath it has developed
into a complex network of national, local and sometimes international actors (Serco),
whose primary motivation is thought to be to use housing provision as a stepping stone
to obtaining bigger government contracts.92 
39 Despite repeated recommendations by the ICIB as well as the Home Affairs Committee,
the Home Office has decided to retain the post-2012 system, insisting that any transfer
of responsibility to local authorities would make the system less rigorous and “reduce
the accountability of the Home Office and the ability to hold providers to account”.93 It
is hard not to read behind this decision the usual mistrust all UK governments have
displayed towards local authorities since 1979. In a written statement in 2019, Caroline
Nokes, the then Minister of State for immigration, announced that the new contracts
would  provide  improvements  on  existing  arrangements  such  as  a  requirement  for
accommodation providers to liaise closely with local authorities, to work with the local
community and voluntary organisations, to have a clear management and inspection
plan, to set clear requirements for standards and inform asylum seekers better about
their rights.94 However, although more central government funding was pledged by her
predecessor to improve the system,95 value for money seems to remain a top priority
behind the new contracts.96 One can only hope asylum seekers will benefit from better
housing conditions. If not, only the Home Office and private contractors will gain from
the renewal of a much-criticised system. 
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ABSTRACTS
The United Kingdom has been a pioneer regarding privatisation policies since the 1980s. This
derives from the coming to power in the UK in 1979 of the New Right with the election of the
Conservatives led by Margaret Thatcher. Privatisation has taken many forms and has spared no
area of society or the economy. Housing has been at the forefront of the public services that have
undergone  privatisation  for  economic,  political  and  practical  reasons.  Within  the  field  of
housing, the rules governing access to asylum accommodation have been altered since the 1990s
and the provision of accommodation has shifted to the private sector since the 2010s.  These
transformations  have  had  consequences  on  asylum  seekers’  housing  conditions.  Going  over
successive parliamentary reports on the matter, one cannot fail to wonder who are the winners
and the losers of these reforms.
Le Royaume-Uni est un pionnier en matière de politiques de privatisation depuis les années 1980.
Ce  choix  découle  de  l’arrivée  au  pouvoir  en  1979  de  la  Nouvelle  Droite  en  la  personne  de
Margaret Thatcher. Cette politique de privatisation a pris des formes multiples et n’a épargné
presqu’aucun pan de la société et de l’économie. Le logement figure au premier rang des services
publics touchés par ces mesures pour des raisons économiques, politiques et pratiques. Au sein
de ce domaine, les règles qui gouvernent l’accès des demandeurs d’asile au logement ont été
modifiées depuis les années 1990 et la fourniture de logements a basculé dans le domaine privé
depuis les années 2010. Ces transformations n’ont pas été sans conséquences sur les conditions de
logement des demandeurs d’asile et à la lecture des multiples rapports parlementaires sur le
sujet il convient de s’interroger sur les gagnants et perdants de ces mesures.
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